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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
David George Conner appeals from the judgment of the district court, 
entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of trafficking marijuana.  On 
appeal, Conner argues the district court erred by admitting evidence of the 
Oregon traffic stop that led to the traffic stop in Idaho and erred by admitting 
evidence regarding Conner’s suspended driver’s license, the basis for the Idaho 
traffic stop.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
Trooper Mills of the Oregon State Police was on duty March 5th, in 
Malheur County, Oregon.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 489, L. 24 – p. 490, L. 10.)  At 
approximately 1:29 a.m. Trooper Mills stopped a red Nissan car for speeding on 
Interstate 84.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 489, L. 24 – p. 491, L. 23; see also Ex. 1.)  
Trooper Mills made contact with Conner, who was the driver and only occupant 
of the car.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 492, Ls. 2 – 12.)  Trooper Mills ran a driver’s license 
check and warrants check on Conner through dispatch.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 494, L. 
21 – p. 495, L. 13.)     
During the traffic stop, Trooper Mills observed several things that caused 
him to become suspicious that Conner was engaged in criminal activity.  (1/22/15 
Tr., p. 497, L. 17 – p. 501, L. 6.)  Trooper Mills stopped Conner early morning on 
March 5th in Malheur County, Oregon.  (Id.)  Conner told Trooper Mills that he 
was going to Caldwell, Idaho.  (Id.)  The car rental paperwork showed that 
Conner rented the car on March 4th and the car was due back in Anderson, 
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California, on March 8th.  (Id.)  Short rental car trips are very common for the 
transportation of drugs.  (Id.)  The car was rented in the middle of the week and it 
was a “very, very short trip.”  (Id.)  When Trooper Mills asked where Conner was 
going, Conner hesitated and appeared to be trying to come up with an answer.  
(Id.)  Eventually, Conner stated he was going to visit a friend in Caldwell but did 
not know the address.  (Id.)  People involved in the transportation of drugs do not 
always know exactly where they are headed until they get close and are given an 
address.  (Id.)  Conner also had several energy drinks and water in the car.  (Id.)  
Trooper Mills attempted to contact his local drug dog, but the drug dog was 
unavailable.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 497, Ls. 1-7.)   
Oregon dispatch informed Trooper Mills that Conner’s driver’s license was 
suspended out of California.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 502, Ls. 4-16.)  Trooper Mills issued 
Conner a warning for his speed and gave him a citation for no “operator’s license 
in Oregon.”  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 504, Ls. 13-16.)  Trooper Mills released Conner.  
(See id.)   
 Trooper Mills called Trooper Klitch of the Idaho State Police and told 
Trooper Klitch what he had observed regarding Conner.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 501, L. 
12 – p. 502.)  Trooper Mills told Trooper Klitch that Conner’s driver’s license was 
suspended.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 512, L. 10 – p. 513, L. 7.)  Trooper Klitch relayed 
Trooper Mills’ information to Sergeant Cagle and Sergeant Tulleners.  (1/22/15 
Tr., p. 524, L. 17 – p. 525, L. 9, p. 559, L. 9 – p. 560, L. 17, p. 561, L. 23 – p. 
562, L. 14, p. 598, L. 14 – 599, L. 16.)   
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Sergeant Tulleners found Conner’s car, in Idaho, headed east on 
Interstate 84, near the Middleton overpass.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 564, L. 15 – p. 565, 
L. 7.)  After Sergeant Tulleners pulled in behind the car, Conner took the first exit 
he came to.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 567, Ls. 2-15.)  Conner was driving only 45 miles 
per hour in a 65 hour zone.  (Id.)   
Based upon the information that Conner was driving on a suspended 
license, Sergeant Tulleners stopped Conner’s car.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 568, Ls. 17-
20.)  Shortly after Sergeant Tulleners stopped Conner, Sergeant Cagle arrived.  
(1/22/15 Tr., p. 569, Ls. 8-11.)  Sergeant Tulleners made contact with Conner, 
the driver of the car.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 569, L. 12 – p. 570, L. 6.)  Sergeant 
Tulleners asked Conner where he was going and Conner said he was going to a 
friend’s house but, even when asked, Conner could not be more specific.  
(1/22/15 Tr., p. 570, Ls. 17-22.)  Sergeant Tulleners contacted dispatch to check 
on the status of Conner’s driver’s license.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 570, L. 23 – p. 571, L. 
12.)   
 Officer Cullen arrived and deployed his drug seeking K-9 while Sergeant 
Tulleners was collecting Conner’s information and running it through dispatch.  
(1/22/15 Tr., p. 571, Ls. 13-23.)  Officer Cullen’s K-9 alerted on the back of 
Conner’s car.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 583, L. 17 – p. 586, L. 7, p. 606, L. 12 – p. 607, L. 
4.)  The officers searched the trunk and found marijuana.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 586, L. 
19 – 588, L. 3, p. 607, L. 5 – p. 608, L. 11.)  The marijuana was packaged in six 
vacuum sealed bags.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 586, L. 19 – 588, L. 3; Exs. 4, 5, 6.)  Kerry 
Hogan, a drug chemist with the Idaho State Police Forensic Services Laboratory, 
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tested the marijuana and found it weighed over five pounds.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 405, 
L. 22 – p. 406, L. 8, p. 454, L. 10 – p. 455, L. 6, p. 457, Ls. 20-25.) 
The state charged Conner with trafficking of five pounds or more of 
marijuana.  (R., pp. 33-34.)  Conner filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence.  
(R., pp. 69-84, 108-109.)  The district court denied Conner’s motion to suppress.  
(R., pp. 141-164.)  
 Conner went to jury trial.  (R., pp. 203-275.)  The jury found Conner guilty 
of trafficking in five pounds or more of marijuana.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 926, L. 7 – p. 
927, L. 22; R., pp. 309-311.)  The district court entered judgment and sentenced 
Conner to seven years with three years fixed.  (R., pp. 325-326.)  Conner timely 






Conner states the issues on appeal as: 
 
I. Did the district court err by admitting evidence of the Oregon 
stop because it is irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, and can 
the State show that error is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt? 
 
II. Did the district court err by admitting evidence that Mr. 
Conner drove without privileges because it is irrelevant and 
prejudicial character evidence, and can the State show that 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?   
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
 1. Has Conner failed to show the district court erred by admitting 
evidence related to the Oregon stop? 
 
 2. Has Conner failed to show the district court erred by admitting 






Evidence of Oregon Stop Is Relevant And Not Unduly Prejudicial 
 
A. Introduction 
 Conner argues that evidence that he was stopped in Oregon is not 
relevant and is unfairly prejudicial.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-13.)  The 
district court did not err.  The Oregon State Trooper, Trooper Mills, observed 
evidence consistent with the trafficking of illegal drugs.  (See 1/22/15 Tr., p. 497, 
L. 17 – p. 501, L. 6.)  Trooper Mills also discovered the evidence that directly led 
to the Idaho traffic stop.  (See 1/22/15 Tr., p. 568, Ls. 17-20.)  Evidence of the 
Oregon stop was relevant to Conner’s trafficking charge and was not unfairly 
prejudicial.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 
(2009) (citations omitted).  Whether evidence is relevant, however, is a question 
of law reviewed de novo.  State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, 919, 342 P.3d 628, 
631 (2014) (citing State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 308, 336 P.3d 232, 241 
(2014)); State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010); 
State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 220 P.3d 1055 (2009).   
 In reviewing a discretionary decision, the appellate court “examine[s] 
whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the 
trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal 
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standards; and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of 
reason.”  Grist, 147 Idaho at 51, 205 P.3d at 1187 (citations omitted); accord 
Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590.  “However, an abuse of 
discretion may be deemed harmless if a substantial right is not affected.  In the 
case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, this Court will grant relief on 
appeal only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties.”  
Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590 (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).    
 
C. Evidence Of The Oregon Stop Was Relevant And Not Unfairly Prejudicial  
 
“Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence.’”  Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 
364, 247 P.3d at 591 (quoting I.R.E. 401) (additional citation omitted).  “Whether 
a fact is ‘of consequence’ or material is determined by its relationship to the legal 
theories presented by the parties.”  Id. (citing State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 
444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008)).   
1. Trooper Mills’ Observations During The Oregon Stop Formed The 
Basis For The Idaho Stop And Supported The State’s Case   
 
In order to prove Conner guilty of Trafficking in Marijuana (Five Pounds or 
More), the state had to prove: 
1. On or about March 5, 2014, 
2. in the state of Idaho, 
3. the defendant David George Conner possessed and/or brought into the 
    state marijuana, 
4. and knew it was marijuana, 
5. and possessed five pounds or more of marijuana. 
 
 8 
(R., p. 294.)  
 
Conner argues that the evidence of the Oregon stop was “not relevant to 
any fact of consequence in this case.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)  Conner argues 
that the district court erred by allowing evidence of the Oregon stop as 
“background information” and this “evidence does not tend to prove or disprove 
any fact of consequence, it is not relevant and is inadmissible under Rules 401 
and 402.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-12.)  Conner argues that where he was 
going and what he was doing was not relevant because it is a trafficking charge 
and not an intent to deliver charge and therefore the only relevant information 
relates to the weight of the drugs.  (Id.)  Conner is incorrect.  
Relevant evidence is “any evidence having a tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  See 
I.R.E. 401.  Evidence that a defendant is engaged in activities consistent with 
trafficking in illegal drugs is relevant to a trafficking charge.  See e.g. State v. 
Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 520, 887 P.3d 57, 65 (Ct. App. 1994) (evidence that 
defendant sent money orders to the same person within the same week as 
packages were sent from fictitious people and address, was relevant because 
“this evidence made it more probable that [the defendant] was engaged in 
trafficking methamphetamine.”)   
Here the Oregon stop, and Trooper Mills’ observations, provided evidence 
that Conner was engaged in behavior consistent with trafficking in illegal drugs.  
(See 1/22/15 Tr., p. 497, L. 17 – p. 501, L. 6.)  The state was required to prove 
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that Conner knew he possessed marijuana and brought marijuana into Idaho.  
(See R., p. 294.)  Trooper Mills’ observations during the Oregon stop have a 
tendency to make it more probable that Conner knew he was trafficking in illegal 
drugs because Conner’s actions were consistent with illegal drug trafficking.     
Further, part of Conner’s defense at trial involved questioning the 
credibility of the officers and their conduct during the Idaho traffic stop.  (See 
1/23/15 Tr., p. 874, L. 18 – p. 875, L. 3, p. 883, L. 1 – p. 884, L. 3.)  The Idaho 
officers had to explain why it was reasonable for them to stop Conner.  The 
reason why the Idaho officers stopped Conner was based upon the information 
they received from the Oregon stop.  (See 1/22/15 Tr., p. 501, L. 12 – p. 502, p. 
512, L. 10 – p. 513, L. 7, Tr., p. 524, L. 17 – p. 525, L. 9, p. 598, L. 14 – 599, L. 
16.)  Without evidence of the Oregon stop, the Idaho officers’ actions would have 
appeared arbitrary and capricious.  As a result, evidence of the Oregon stop was 
relevant.   
Conner also argues the evidence of the Oregon stop was unfairly 
prejudicial because it “tended to show that Mr. Conner is a dishonest and 
suspicious person who disrespects the law, and thus suggests a decision on an 
improper basis.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 12 (citing State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 
870, 264 P.3d 975, 977 (Ct. App. 2011).)  “Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial 
simply because it is damaging to a defendant’s case.”  State v. Fordyce, 151 
Idaho 868, 870, 264 P.3d 975, 977 (Ct. App. 2011).  “Evidence is unfairly 
prejudicial when it suggests decision on an improper basis.”  Id. (citing State v. 
Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 465, 235 P.3d 409, 415 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. 
 
 10 
Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1994)).  There is nothing 
about the Oregon stop that is unfairly prejudicial to Conner.  The Oregon stop 
does not show that Conner “is a dishonest and suspicious person who 
disrespects the law.”  And even if it did, evidence of Conner’s credibility, 
suspicions and attitude towards law enforcement are all fair game and this 
evidence would not be unfairly prejudicial simply because it damages his case.  
Conner failed to show the district court erred by holding that evidence of the 
Oregon stop was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial.   
 
2. Evidence Of The Oregon Stop Was Harmless Because It Did Not 
Contribute To The Jury’s Verdict  
 
Even if this Court concludes the trial court erred by admitted evidence of 
the Oregon traffic stop, reversal is not warranted.  The rules of evidence 
expressly provide that “[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.”  I.R.E. 
103(a); see also I.C.R. 52 (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does 
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”).  Consistent with this 
evidentiary rule, the appellate courts of this state will grant relief from an 
incorrect ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence “only if the error affects a 
substantial right of one of the parties.”  Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d 
at 590 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord State v. Ehrlick, 
158 Idaho 900, 911, 354 P.3d 462, 473 (2014).  An erroneous evidentiary ruling 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it did not contribute to the verdict.  
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010).   
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Conner argues “[h]ere the State cannot show that Mr. Conner’s guilty 
verdict was surely unattributable to evidence of the Oregon stop.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 13 (citation omitted).)  Conner is incorrect.  Officer Cullen’s K-9 alerted 
on the back of Conner’s car.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 583, L. 17 – p. 586, L. 7, p. 606, L. 
12 – p. 607, L. 4.)  The Idaho officers searched the trunk of Conner’s car and 
found six bags of marijuana.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 586, L. 19 – 588, L. 3, p. 607, L. 5 – 
p. 608, L. 11; Exs. 4, 5, 6.)  Kerry Hogan, a drug chemist with the Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services Laboratory, confirmed that it was marijuana and that it 
weighed over five pounds.  (1/22/15 Tr., p. 405, L. 22 – p. 406, L. 8, p. 454, L. 10 
– p. 455, L. 6, p. 457, Ls. 20-25.)  Even if evidence of the Oregon stop was 
erroneously admitted, such an error was harmless because it did not contribute 
to the jury verdict finding Conner guilty of trafficking in five pounds or more of 
marijuana.  Conner was convicted because he had over five pounds of marijuana 
in the trunk of his car – not because he had a traffic stop in Oregon.   
 
II. 
The District Court Did Not Err When It Admitted Evidence Regarding Conner’s 
Suspended California License 
 
A. Introduction 
 Conner argues that the district court erred when it allowed evidence 
regarding Conner’s suspended license to be admitted.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-
17.)  Conner alleges the district court erred because it admitted this evidence 
without analyzing it within the context of Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b).  (Id.)  
The district court did not err.  Evidence of Conner’s suspended license was 
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inseparably connected with his trafficking offense and the jury could not have 
been given a rational explanation of his crime without reference to the status of 
his license.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion.  Grist, 147 Idaho at 51, 205 P.3d at 1187; see also 
supra § I(B).    
 
C. Evidence Of Conner’s Driver’s License Was Inseparably Connected To 
The Charge That He Drove Over Five Pounds Of Marijuana In His Car 
Into Idaho 
 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) does not apply to evidence of Conner’s 
driver’s license.  Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) states that “[e]vidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.”  I.R.E. 404(b).  An 
exception to the Rule 404(b) prohibition of other misconduct evidence is res 
gestae, or the “complete story principle,” where “the charged act and the 
uncharged act are so inseparably connected that the jury cannot be given a 
rational and complete presentation of the alleged crime without reference to the 
uncharged misconduct.”  State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 19, 878 P.2d 188, 
193 (Ct. App. 1994).  As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in State v. Izatt, 96 
Idaho 667, 670, 534 P.2d 1107 (1975): 
The state is entitled to present a full and accurate account of the 
circumstances of the commission of the crime, and if such an 
account also implicates the defendant or defendants in the 
commission of other crimes for which they have not been charged, 
 
 13 
the evidence is nevertheless admissible. The jury is entitled to base 
its decision upon a full and accurate description of the events 
concerning the whole criminal act, regardless of whether such a 
description also implicates a defendant in other criminal acts. 
 
See also McCormick on Evidence, § 190 (7th ed. 1999) (“other-crime evidence 
should be admissible to complete the story…when the material in question is 
necessary to a fair understanding of the behavior of the individuals involved in 
the criminal enterprise or the events immediately leading up to them.”) (footnotes 
omitted).   
Here, evidence of Conner’s driver’s license is inseparably connected to 
the trafficking charge and without evidence of Conner’s driver’s license 
suspension, the jury could not be given a rational complete presentation of the 
crime and the police officer’s conduct.  Conner was only able to commit the 
trafficking offense by driving on his suspended license.   
In addition, the reason the Idaho officers stopped Conner was because 
they received information that his driver’s license had been suspended.  (See 
e.g. 1/22/15 Tr., p. 568, Ls. 17-20.)  The only way the jury could have been given 
a logical explanation of how Conner was caught with five pounds of marijuana in 
his trunk would be to admit evidence related to his driver’s license.  This is 
especially true because part of Conner’s defense at trial involved questioning the 
credibility of the officers and their conduct during the Idaho traffic stop.  (See 
1/23/15 Tr., p. 874, L. 18 – p. 875, L. 3, p. 883, L. 1 – p. 884, L. 3.)  The officer’s 
motives and credibility were at issue and the jury was entitled to hear a full 
explanation of what they did and why.  Since evidence of Conner’s driver’s 
license was inseparably connected to the charged offense, trafficking five 
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pounds of marijuana in his car, it is res gestae and is not impermissible 404(b) 
character evidence.   
Even if Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) applied, this rule would not prohibit 
the state from introducing evidence of Conner’s driver’s license.  Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) prevents “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” from 
being admitted “to prove the character of a person in order to show that the 
person acted in conformity therewith.”  I.R.E. 404(b).  Evidence of Conner’s 
driver’s license was not admitted to prove Conner’s character in order to show he 
acted in conformity with that character.  The status of a driver’s license has 
nothing to do with Conner’s character.  Nor was the state attempting to prove 
anything about Conner’s character nor would Conner’s character have anything 
to do with the trafficking charge.   
Finally, even if 404(b) applied, evidence of driving on a suspended license 
would be admissible because 404(b) evidence can be admitted to prove 
“opportunity.”  See I.R.E. 404(b).  Conner had the opportunity to commit 
trafficking only because he was driving on his suspended license in his rented 
car.  No matter how it is examined, the district court did not err by admitting 
evidence that Conner’s driver’s license was suspended.   
 
1. Evidence Of Conner’s Driver’s License Was Harmless Because It 
Did Not Contribute To The Jury’s Verdict 
 
 Even if the district court erred, the error was harmless.  An erroneous 
evidentiary ruling is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it did not contribute 
to the verdict.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 222, 245 P.3d at 974.  The jury did not find 
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Conner guilty of trafficking because he was driving on a suspended license – the 
jury found him guilty of trafficking because the Idaho officers found over five 




 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court.  
 DATED this 7th day of June, 2016. 
 
 
       
 __/s/ Ted S. Tollefson____ 
 TED S. TOLLEFSON 
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